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Truver: Cutting the Party Line: How the SEC Can Silence Persisting Phone

NOTE
CUTTING THE PARTY LINE:
HOW THE SEC CAN SILENCE PERSISTING
PHONE CALL TIPS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental premise of the U.S. federal securities laws is full
and fair disclosure to all investors regardless of status or number of
shares in their portfolios.' Then why, after more than seventy years of
prohibition, are there still blatant incidents of corporate favoritism and
selective disclosure to those privileged few with access to the party
line? 2 In 2008, the chief executive officer ("CEO") of a publically traded
company, Mamma.com, personally called one of its most prominent
investors to relay material, nonpublic information. The investor
allegedly used that information, which he received only by virtue of his
status, to avoid a substantial loss. 4 The Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC")5 brought charges against the investor for, among
other infractions, violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("1934 Act").' However, mysteriously missing from the SEC's
1. See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (stating that the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were created together to promote investor access to reliable
information regarding publically traded securities); see also SEC v. N. Am. Research & Dev. Corp.,
280 F. Supp. 106, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970)
(stating that the purpose of §5 of the Securities Act of 1933 is to protect investors by requiring
disclosure of information).
2. See, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551
(5th Cir. 2010).
3. Id. at 717.
4. Id.at718.
5. The SEC was established by the 1934 Act to regulate the securities markets. 15 U.S.C.
§78d(a) (2006).
6. Complaint at 1, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 03-08-CV2050-D) [hereinafter Cuban Complaint]. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlawful for any
person, by the means of interstate commerce, to employ a deceptive device in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b).
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complaint was a cause of action against the CEO who selectively
disclosed the material, nonpublic information in the first place.7 This is a
classic example of selective disclosure, explicitly prohibited by the
securities laws and yet no action was initiated against the disclosing
CEO or his company.8 In light of SEC v. Cuban,9 it must be asked:
where did the law get lost?
Prior to government regulation, the U.S. stock market was riddled
with incidents of corporate officers abusing their access to inside
information and manipulating the market through the selective
disclosure of information.' 0 The enactment of the Securities Act of 1933
("1933 Act")" in conjunction with the 1934 Act1 2 sought to end these
practices, reinstating investor confidence in the securities market by
promoting fairness among investors through disclosure.13 Congress
understood that market fairness was equally tied to notions of
informational parity as well as the minimization of fraud1 4 and that open
disclosure of information that impacts the value of stock is essential to
an efficient and fair securities market.' 5 Thus, Congress turned to

7. Cuban Complaint, supranote 6, at 2.
8. See generally id. (the complaint, although stating that the CEO selectively disclosed
information, only sought a judgment from the court enjoining the CEO from future securities laws
violations and ordering him to pay a civil penalty).
9. 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated,620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
10. See S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 11 (1934).
11. 15 U.S.C. §77a-77aa.
12. Id. §78a-77nn.
13. See Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation,
28 CARDozo L. REV. 333, 363-64 (2006); see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Secrecy, the
Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 98
(1986) (stating that the anti-fruad provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts required increased
disclosure to fight the inherently unfair information disparities between investors).
14. Regarding the 1933 Act, Congress stated that:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public ....
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and
true information before the investor; ... to restore the confidence of the prospective
investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive channels of
industry and development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to
aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power.
S. REP. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933); see also Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REv. 322, 357, 360 (1979) (noting that
the history of securities legislation suggests Congress sought to protect individual investors from
informational advantages established by market institutions); Gill North, Efficiency, Fairness &
Irrationality. Incompatible or Complimentary?, 24 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 311, 331 (2009)
("[M]arket fairness is most commonly linked to concepts of informational parity, equality of access
to information, minimization of fraud, investor protection, and investor confidence in the integrity
of the market.").
15. See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 3.
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mandatory disclosure obligations to level the playing field for all
investors.' 6
The securities laws have endured a grueling journey since the
institution of the 1933 and 1934 Acts to today's prohibitions. To initially
promote compliance with the newly imposed disclosure obligations, the
securities laws included antifraud provisions, prescribing punishment for
violations such as failure to disclose and fraudulent disclosure. 7 While
§ 16 of the 1934 Act prohibits certain trades "[fjor the purpose of
preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained
by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer," 8 it was not until nearly thirty years after the
creation of the federal securities laws that the courts began to prohibit
the behavior we now know as insider trading.' 9
The court in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 20 employed the antifraud
prohibitions of both Acts to create the insider trading offense and further
promote fairness through disclosure. 2 ' The court prohibited trading on
inside information as a violation of Rule lOb-5. 22 The SEC explained
that the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts combat the
"inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such
[nonpublic] information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing." 23 By creating the insider trading offense, In re Cady
applied the fairness-through-full-disclosure doctrine to secondary

trading. 2 4

16. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,717 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
17. Brudney, supra note 14, at 357; see also Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail
Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2009) (stating that Congress's initial intent in establishing a
mandatory disclosure framework was to protect investors).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b); see Brown, supra note 13, at 98.
19. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961).
20. 40 S.E.C. 907.
21. Id. at 911.
22. Id. at 913-14 (stating that insider trading is fraud under Section l0b and any person who,
by some relationship, has access to nonpublic information has a duty to disclose that information).
Rule lOb-5 is the general anti-fraud provision that has developed into the prohibition on insider
trading. Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 572 (2008).
23. In re Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
24. See id. at 911-14. Promoting fairness through public disclosure of information remained a
primary goal of the SEC and its insider trading prohibition since 1961. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Such inequities based upon unequal access to
knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our way of life, or in view of the
congressional concern in the area, remain uncorrected."); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638
(1988) (stating that an overarching policy of the federal securities laws is to promote investor
confidence through equal access to information).
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The violation proved to be more difficult to demonstrate than the
SEC had anticipated.2 5 Through a muddled configuration of case law,
the prohibition on insider trading developed into two main theories: the
classical theory for "insiders" 26 and the misappropriation theory for
"outsiders." 27 While the SEC expected that these two theories would
facilitate its campaign against insider trading, the already complex case
law simply could not encompass the constantly evolving and inventive
methods devised to violate the ban on the use of insider information in
trading. 28 Thus, the SEC turned to its rule-making power, fashioning
piecemeal measures to address specific types of insider trading,
including Rule 10b5-2 2 9 and Rule 14e-3.30 Another such measure is
Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation FD").
Regulation FD was adopted in response to concerns surrounding
issuers who selectively disclose information to select individuals, which
could lead to a loss of confidence in the integrity and fairness of the
markets. 3 2 The classic example Regulation FD seeks to deter is where an
25. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230-33 (1980) (reaffirming the
classical theory but refusing to extend the prohibition based on that theory to one who was not a
corporate insider).
26. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (explaining how the two theories
developed through case law). An insider, in this context, is one who by the faculty of their
employment can gain information only available for corporate purposes. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227.
The classical theory of insider trading imposes liability for a violation of Rule 1Ob-5 when trading
on material, nonpublic information because the trading violates a duty owed to the person with
whom the insider trades. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
27. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (defining "outsiders" as "persons who
are neither insiders of the companies whose shares are being traded, nor tippees of such insiders").
Under the misappropriation theory, a person is liable for a violation of Rule lob-5 when
misappropriating inside information in violation of some fiduciary duty owed to another party. Id.
For a discussion on the two prominent theories through which the SEC attempts to curb insider
trading, see generally A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O'Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell's
Legacyfor the Law ofInsider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13 (1998).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991). In Chestman, the
defendant traded on material, nonpublic information he received from his wife. Id. at 555. The court
refused to imply a duty of trust or confidence between husband and wife and so held that the
defendant could not be found liable under the misappropriation theory. Id. at 571.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2009). In response to the holding in Chesiman, the SEC enacted
Rule I 0b5-2 to define specific types of relationships that create a duty to satisfy the requirements of
the misappropriation theory. Marc 1. Steinberg, Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure, and Prompt
Disclosure:A ComparativeAnalysis, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 635, 646-47 (2001).
30. 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(a). In response to the holding in Chiarella, Rule 14e-3 makes it
unlawful for any person to be in possession of material information regarding "a substantial step or
steps" in the creation of a tender offer if that person received such information directly or indirectly
from the offering person, the issuer, or an insider. Id.
31.

Id § 243.100.

32. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (proposed Dec.
28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) ("[S]elective disclosure poses a serious
threat to investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities markets."); see also Floyd
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issuer offers material, nonpublic information to only privileged
individuals and investors based upon the size of their investments and
not to the trading public as a whole. 33 A perfect illustration of this
behavior is found in the actions of Mamma.com's CEO in relation to the
SEC enforcement action against Mark Cuban. 34 Yet, the SEC's
complaint made no mention of Regulation FD or the unlawful actions of
Mamma.com's CEO. It appears the CEO was able to avoid liability
due to a loophole created by Regulation FD for selectively disclosing
insiders who hide behind claims of confidentiality agreements.36
This Note urges the SEC to revise Regulation FD as it has
inadvertently become a shield for those who selectively disclose
information rather than imposing liability for such actions. This Note
outlines how the SEC's enactment of Regulation FD, while spurned by
admirable intentions to thwart selective disclosure, has led to an
unforeseen loophole and how minor alterations will make this regulation
more effective in its efforts to promote fairness through disclosure.
Similarly, this Note urges the SEC to more effectively apply a revised
Regulation FD so that all players potentially involved in an instance of
selective disclosure will be on notice to "hang up the phone."
Part II of this Note discusses the history of the adoption of
Regulation FD, highlighting the difficulties of prohibiting selective
disclosure through existing insider trading law. It also describes
Regulation FD's early victories in the fight against selective disclosure.
Part III explains the criticisms surrounding the adoption of
Regulation FD and its early set backs in the courts. In addition, this
section describes how a well-deliberated rule to prohibit selective
disclosure in actuality became a shield behind which those who
selectively disclose can hide.
Part IV suggests several alterations to Regulation FD whereby the
rule's original intentions can once again be achieved. Through an
analysis of several cases, this section highlights how Regulation FD, in

Norris, Wall Street Snarls at S.E.C. Proposal on Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at C16
("'The all-too-common practice of selectively disseminating material information is a disservice to
investors and undermines the fundamental principle of fairness ... .This practice leads to potential
conflicts of interest for analysts and undermines investor confidence in our markets."' (quoting
former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt)).
33. See Danny Hakim, S.E.C. Approves Regulation Against Selective Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. I1, 2000, at C8.
34. SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th
Cir. 2010).
35. Cuban Complaint, supra note 6, at 1-2, 8.
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (offering an exemption for selectively disclosed
information where the party receiving the information agrees to keep the information confidential).
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its reformed state, could be effective in battling insider trading. It also
suggests that this already existing rule could help combat the SEC's
ongoing war against hedge funds. In conclusion, this Note suggests that
a reformed Regulation could put potential players on notice to stop
insider trading before it begins, not after the damage has been done.
II. HISTORY OF THE PROHIBITION ON SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE
By enacting the 1934 Act, Congress established a mandatory
disclosure system to promote a fair and efficient market. 37 Since its
enactment, full disclosure has become a leading doctrine of the federal
securities laws. However, the federal securities laws do not require
public disclosure of every important business development when it
occurs. 39 Furthermore, while the laws urge prompt disclosure as a best
practice, timing over corporate disclosures largely remains at the
discretion of the issuer.40 As a result of this discretion, selective
disclosure can often occur. 41
Selective disclosure is the practice in which issuers of publically
traded securities "selectively provide material, nonpublic information to
certain persons-often securities analysts or institutional investorsbefore disclosing the same information to the public." 42 Traditionally,
issuers met with analysts to discuss information not yet publically
distributed, which could potentially have an effect on the issuer's stock

price. 43

Such discussions offer an informational advantage to a small group
of select investors.44 These practices could potentially lead to the use of
material, nonpublic information as a commodity and to insider trading.4 5

37. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591.
38. John P. Jennings, Regulation FD: SEC Reestablishes Enforcement Capabilities Over
Selective Disclosure, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 543, 549 (2001); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the 1933 Act is "to provide investors with full
disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities").
39. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Written Statement Concerning Regulation Fair Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N
(May 17, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051701wssec.htm.
43. J. Scott Colesanti, Bouncing the Tightrope: The S.E.C. Attacks Selective Disclosure,But
Provides Little Stability for Analysts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 19-21 (2000) (discussing the role of
analysts in determining future stock prices).
44. Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(K) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
469, 500 n.140 (2001) (stating that prior to Regulation FD analysts often benefitted from
"informational advantage[s]").
45. Evans, supra note 17, at 1111 (stating that before Regulation FD, many issuers were using
information as a commodity to bolster favors from the investment community, including analysts).
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The SEC originally elected to rectify this behavior by imposing liability
for insider trading under Rule 1Ob-5 of the 1934 Act.
A. JudicialBackgroundRegarding Selective Disclosure
Under the rule-making power granted by the 1934 Act, the SEC
enacted Rule 1Ob-5 which prohibits the trading of securities on the basis
of material, nonpublic information as it constitutes a manipulative or
deceptive device.46 Information is material if there is "a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in
deciding whether or not to trade.47 Information is nonpublic if it is
disseminated in any way other than a public announcement.4 8 Therefore,
it would seem that most selective disclosures clearly come within the
purview of insider trading liability established under Rule 1Ob-5 .4
However, the courts have been sympathetic to the realities of the
corporate world, recognizing the essential role market professionals
dealing with nonpublic information play in the functioning of a
50
corporation.
46. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. Insider trading is typically thought to violate clauses (a) and (c) of the rule. Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 n.5 (1980).
47. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976) (determining the
standard of materiality for proxy solicitation); see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988).
The Court in Basic adopted the TSC Industries standard for materiality in relation to Section 1I0(b)
and Rule lOb-5. Id. at 232.
48. See In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 643 (1971) ("Information is non-public
when it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors generally.").
49. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593 (proposed Dec.
28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249). Early insider trading case law suggested
that traders were required to have equal access to information, which led to an understanding that
selective disclosure of material, nonpublic information could lead to liability. Id.; see also SEC v.
Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The only regulatory objective [of insider
trading prohibition] is that access to material information be enjoyed equally . . . .").
50. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 n.16 (recognizing that Congress believed certain market
professionals offer a valuable service to the market while in possession of nonpublic information).
The Court explained certain exceptions for liability apply to market professionals "based upon
Congress' recognition that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same time
they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of [nonpublic
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One of the SEC's most noted early attempts to limit the potential
harm from selective disclosure occurred in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc.5t In Bausch & Lomb, the SEC attempted to impose liability for
violations of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 on Bausch &
Lomb's chairman for selectively disclosing information regarding the
company's future earnings estimate. 5 2 While the court found that the
earnings estimates were material, nonpublic information, it determined
that the incident was an isolated occurrence, unlikely to occur again and
lacking the required scienter for Rule lOb-5 liability. 53
The court also acknowledged that although giving analysts direct
material, nonpublic information was prohibited, offering "tidbits" of
information, having significance only to a skilled analyst in combination
with other information, is encouraged to promote an efficient market. 5 4
Bausch & Lomb denied liability for this incident of selective disclosure
based on the irrelevancy of the specific information disclosed to the
individual, yet acknowledged the possibility of Rule lOb-5 liability to
discourage unwanted selective disclosure.
The threat of Rule 1Ob-5 liability for simple possession of material,
nonpublic information was discarded in the Supreme Court's decision in
Chiarella v. United States.S6 The SEC attempted to establish liability
based on a "parity of information" approach.57 The "parity of
information" approach imposed Rule 1Ob-5 liability for anyone, insider
or not, who was in possession of material, nonpublic information at the
time of a securities trade.5 Instead, the Court held that there must be a
breach of trust or confidence before insider trading liability can be
enforced.
The Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC 60 further hindered
the SEC's ability to impose insider trading liability on those engaging in
information]." Id.
51. 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
52. Id. at 13-14. The chairman of Bausch & Lomb, Inc. deliberately disclosed an earnings
estimate, not yet made public, to an analyst. Id. at 13. He disclosed the information in attempts to
correct the analyst's own estimate that was considerably lower than the firm's estimated earnings.
Id.
53. Id. at 14, 19 (stating that an action will not stand without a showing of scienter, defined as
"intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
54. Id. at 9.
55. See id. at 14-15 (holding that a duty to disclose only arises when it is certain to have a
"substantial effect on the market price").
56. 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
57. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593 (proposed Dec.
28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
58. Id.; see Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233.
59. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230, 233.
60. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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selective disclosure. The SEC attempted to address selective disclosure
in terms of "tipping" material, nonpublic information from an insider to
analysts. 6 1 In Dirks, an analyst received material, nonpublic information
regarding consistent fraud occurring in a publically traded company
from an insider of that company. 62 The analyst then disclosed the
information to his clients and other investors, several of whom later
traded on the basis of the information to their profit. 63
The SEC argued that one who knowingly receives material,
nonpublic information from an insider has a duty to disclose the
information before trading upon it. 4 Once again, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that a person is subject to liability under Rule lOb5 for trading while simply in possession of material, nonpublic
information provided by an insider. The Court adopted a new standard
by which one might be held liable for selectively disclosing
information. 6 6 This standard required that: (1) the insider breached a
fiduciary duty to the corporation by making the disclosure; (2) the
insider received a direct or indirect benefit for the disclosure; and (3) the
recipient of the information breached a duty to the shareholders by
trading upon the information received.67 This standard imposed greater
restraints on the SEC in establishing liability for selective disclosure.
The Court's new standard for liability requires that the recipient
owe a duty to the shareholders. Under Dirks, a duty to disclose or
abstain from trading might be imposed upon a recipient of material,
nonpublic information in one of two ways: (1) the recipient trades based
upon the information, knowing it was provided in breach of a duty; or
(2) in trading on the information, the recipient breached a confidential
relationship with the company.69

61. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651, 655-56; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 72,593.
62. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 651.
65. Id. at 665-67.
66. See id. at 661-63.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 659.
69. See id at 660 (explaining the facts required to establish a duty to disclose or abstain). The
Court in Dirks acknowledged that under certain circumstances an outsider may become a temporary
insider of a corporation, creating a duty to disclose or abstain. Id. at 655 n. 14 ("[W]here corporate
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant . . . [t]he
basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is . .that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes.").
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The Court also required that the insider personally benefit from the
disclosure in order to impose liability. 70 Absent a motivation for
personal gain, an insider who selectively discloses material, nonpublic
information has not breached a duty to the shareholders.7 1 Dirks
significantly hindered the SEC's "ability to pursue insider trading
actions in selective disclosure matters, as it was difficult to prove the
'personal benefit' nexus underlying any prohibited selective
disclosure." 72 Since the "personal benefit" requirement is most often
interpreted as a financial benefit, something rarely received from
selectively disclosing information, the Court's new standards have been
widely recognized as permitting selective disclosure.7 3 Thus, as an
inside-information-as-contraband approach failed, the SEC chose to
specifically target types of information through its rule-making power.
B. Regulation FD Is Adopted
Following the SEC's loss in Dirks, there have been few insider
trading cases involving selective disclosure.74 That is not to say,
however, that incidents of selective disclosure are no longer occurring,
just that these incidents do not violate the threshold established by the
Supreme Court in Dirks. The reported incidents were believed to occur
mostly in private meetings or conference calls between analysts or other
70. Id. at 662.
71. See id
72. Jon Jordan, Corporate Issuers Beware: Schering-Plough and Recent SEC Enforcement
Actions Signal Vigorous Enforcement of Regulation FD, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751, 753 (2004); see
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593 (proposed Dec. 28, 1999) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
73. See Clay Richards, Selective Disclosure: "A Fencing Match Conducted on a Tightrope"
and Regulation FD-The SEC's Latest Attempt to "Electrify the Tightrope," 70 Miss. L.J. 417, 425
(2000) (explaining that the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks has been widely construed to insulate
corporate officers and analysts from liability because the "personal benefit" test has been most often
of some pecuniary gain, which is not often found in incidents of selective disclosure). But see SEC
v. Phillip J. Stevens, SEC Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 SEC Docket 739 (Mar. 19, 1991) (the
SEC alleged a personal gain based on a corporate official's attempt to protect his reputation).
74. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593 & n.31 (noting that the
only selective disclosure action brought since the ruling in Dirks was SEC v. Phillip J. Stevens).
75. See id. at 72,591-92. In the years preceding the adoption of Regulation FD there had been
many publically reported incidents of selective disclosure due to favoritism and influence. See id.
76. See, e.g., George Anders & Robert Bemer, Webvan to Delay IPO in Response to SEC
Concerns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1999, at C16 (where SEC "concerns" delayed an IPO but no insider
trading action was filed); Susan Pulliam & Gary McWilliams, Compaq Is Criticizedfor How It
Disclosed PC Troubles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1999, at Cl (despite the SEC's concerns, the company
could not be prosecuted for insider trading because the complaint lacked a "personal benefit"
requirement); Randall Smith, Conference Calls to Big Investors Often Leave Little Guys Hung Up,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at Cl (explaining that many conference calls have out-run the SEC's
insider trading regulation for lack of a personal gain).
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individuals and not to the public at large. n Understanding that selective
disclosure poses a threat to investor confidence in the integrity and
fairness of the market, the SEC sought to curb the practice.78
The SEC could have responded to evidence of on-going selective
disclosure throughout the market by arguing for an extension of the
insider trading doctrine. Recognizing, however, that the insider trading
laws are riddled with uncertainties,79 the SEC chose to address the
problem of selective disclosure through its rule-making powers.80
Seventeen years following the set back created by the Dirks decision, the
SEC overhauled its arsenal by proposing Regulation FD.8 ' On August
10, 2000, the SEC adopted Regulation FD in an attempt to bring "'all
investors, regardless of the size of their holdings, into the information
loop-where they belong."' 82
1. Requirements
Regulation FD, like the disclosure rules prior to its adoption, does
not require that all material corporate developments be disclosed.
Instead, it requires that when an issuer chooses to disclose material,
nonpublic information, it must do so broadly to the investing public, not
selectively to a "privileged few." 83 The basic premise of Regulation FD,
as discussed in Rule 100,84 stipulates that whenever an issuer, or
someone acting on its behalf, discloses material, nonpublic information
to enumerated persons, the issuer must make the disclosure public either
"simultaneously" (for intentional disclosures) or "promptly" (for nonintentional disclosures).85
77. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591-92 & n. 11 (citing the
National Investor Relation Institute, which reported that 26% of responding companies reported that
they engaged in selective disclosure practices); see Colesanti, supra note 43, at 4-5 (citing Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591-92).
78. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593-94.
79. See James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625,
638-39 (2007).
80. Id. at 639. Congress has granted the SEC power to create rules in order to supplement the
securities laws of the United States. See 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (2006). Congress granted the
commission "authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter, including rules and regulations
governing registration statements and prospectuses for various classes of securities and issuers." Id.
81. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-03 (2009).
82. Commission Votes to End Selective Disclosure; Chairman Levitt Hails Leveling of
Information Playing Field, SEC NEWS DIG., Aug. 11, 2000, at 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/digest/2000/dig08l 100.pdf (quoting former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt).
83. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716, 51,719 (Aug. 24,
2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
84. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100.
85. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719.
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Selective disclosures are "intentional" when the issuer, or a person
acting on its behalf, knows or is reckless in not knowing that the
information disclosed is both material and nonpublic.8 6 Regulation FD
requires that disclosures conveyed intentionally be publically
disseminated "simultaneously," but that requirement is not defined.
However, "promptly," in reference to non-intentional disclosures, is
defined to mean "as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event
after ... 24 hours)."
Once a disclosure has been made, and Regulation FD applies, the
statement must be made "public," as prescribed by Rule 101(e). 89
"Public disclosure," for the purposes of Regulation FD, can be made by
filing a Form 8-K90 or "through another method (or combination of
methods) of disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad,
non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public."9 1 The
rule does not stipulate an exhaustive list of methods by which an issuer
makes information "public." 92 Rather, the availability of alternative
methods allows the issuer to determine how best to achieve nonexclusionary distribution of information to the general public. 9 3
However, the final release does stipulate several acceptable methods for
making a disclosure public, including widely circulated news services
and press conferences. 94
2. Scope
One of the most frequently voiced concerns surrounding the
adoption of proposed Regulation FD is the potential for the rule to
decrease issuer disclosure due to a fear of liability. 9 5 While the proposed
rule assured issuers that violations of Regulation FD would not provide a
basis for private liability,96 the SEC modified its rule to "provide even
greater protection against the possibility of inappropriate liability, and to
guard further against the likelihood of any chilling effect resulting from
86.
87.
88.
89.
51,723.
90.
51,723.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
1999) (to

17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100-03.
Id. § 243.101(d); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,722.
17 C.F.R. §243.101(e); see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at
17 C.F.R.

§

243.101(e)(1); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at

17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e)(2).
See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723-24.
See id at 51,723.
Id. at 51,723-24.
Id. at 51,733.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,598 (proposed Dec. 28,
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
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the regulation." 97 To accomplish these goals, the SEC limited the types
of personnel covered by the regulation and the types of communications
to persons outside the issuer to which the regulation would apply.
The revised scope of Regulation FD narrows the rule's application
to enumerated persons who are prohibited from selectively disclosing
material, nonpublic information and those for whom the selective
disclosure is intended. Regulation FD prohibits an issuer, or anyone
acting on behalf of an issuer, from selectively disclosing information. 98
For the purpose of Regulation FD, "issuer" applies to nearly all
"reporting companies." 99
As proposed, Regulation FD defined a "[p]erson acting on behalf of
an issuer" as "[a]ny officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer,
who discloses material nonpublic information while acting within the
scope of his or her authority."o0 0 In response to criticism, the SEC
narrowed that definition to "any senior official of the issuer" or "any
other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer who regularly
communicates [with one of the enumerated categories of persons in Rule
0
100(b)(1)] . . . or with holders of the issuer's securities."' ' This
definition limits the scope of the regulation to cover only those
employees of a company who regularly interact with market
professionals or security holders.10 2
Additionally, as proposed, Regulation FD applied to all
communications "to any person outside the issuer."' 0 3 In order to more
effectively address the specific problem of "selective disclosure made to
those who would reasonably be expected to trade securities on the basis
of the information or provide others with advice about securities
trading[j" the SEC narrowed Regulation FD's scope to only certain
enumerated persons in Rule 100(b)(1).1 04
97. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718.
98. Id. at 51,719.
99. Colesanti, supra note 43, at 7; see Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 51,725. Regulation FD applies to all issuers "with securities registered under Section 12 of the
Exchange Act, and all issuers required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act." Id.
at 51,724.
100. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,611.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2009).
102. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718. By limiting the
application of Regulation FD, the SEC understood that not all communications should trigger the
regulation. See id at 51,720 n.36. The regulation does not cover every employee who occasionally
may communicate with outsiders. Id. Thus, information disclosed in the course of business would
be outside the course of ordinary business. Furthermore, this limitation suggests Regulation FD only
imposes liability on egregious acts of selective disclosure by those in positions who should have
known better. See id.
103. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,605.
104. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719.
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Rule 100(b)(1) enumerates four categories of recipients to whom
selective disclosure may not be made. 05 The first three categories are
market professionals: (1) broker-dealers or a person associated with a
broker-dealer; (2) investment advisors, institutional investment
managers and associated persons; and (3) investment companies, hedge
funds and affiliated persons. 106 The fourth category is a holder of the
issuer's securities, where it is reasonable that such a person would trade
on the basis of the selectively disclosed information. 0 7 Thus, liability
for selective disclosure will be limited to situations involving those who
could reasonably be expected to misuse the improperly disclosed
information.' 08
However, Rule 100(b)(2) specifies three express exclusions to the
enumerated persons in Rule 100(b)(1).1 09 The first two exclusions are
for situations in which any misuse of information would trigger liability
under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act."10 These exceptions are: (1)
communications to a person who owes the issuer a duty of trust or
confidence;"' and (2) communications made to a person who expressly
agrees to maintain the information in confidence.11 2 The third exception
is for communications made in connection with securities offerings
registered under the 1933 Act." 3 These exclusions also recognize the
necessity to disclose material, nonpublic information in the course of
legitimate business purposes.114

105. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1).
106. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,719.
107. Id. at 51,719-20.
108. See id at 51,720.
109. 17 C.F.R. §243.100(b)(2). Prior to October 4, 2010, Rule 100(b)(2) included a fourth
exception for a disclosure to a credit rating agency such that the information "is disclosed solely for
the purpose of developing a credit rating and the entity's ratings are publicly available." Id.
§ 243.100(b)(2)(iii). As required by the provisions of section 939B of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the SEC amended Regulation FD to remove the
exemption provided to disclosures made to statistical rating organizations and credit rating agencies.
Removal From Regulation FD of the Exemption For Credit Rating Agencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,050,
61,050 (Oct. 4, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243).
110. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(i).
112. Id. §243.100(b)(2)(ii).
113. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(iv). Regulation FD offers exemptions for disclosures made in relation
to specified offerings such that issuers would violate § 5 of the 1933 Act. Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,725. Section 5 places limitation on disclosures that can be made
at various intervals during offerings. Id. These exemptions ensure that compliance with Regulation
FD will not conflict with the other conditions placed upon an issuer by way of the federal securities
laws. Id.
114. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
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C. Regulation FD in PracticeandEarly Victories
Following Regulation FD's adoption in 2000, the SEC sought
The first concerned
enforcement for two types of violations.
"egregious violations involving the intentional or reckless disclosure of
information that is unquestionably material." 1 6 The second concerned
those "who deliberately attempt to game the system either by speaking
in code, or stepping over the line again and again.""' Concerned with
the continued presence of selective disclosure in the market, the SEC
brought several enforcement actions in an attempt to illustrate that such
behavior would not be tolerated.' 18 After overcoming harsh criticism in
its infancy, 1 19 Regulation FD came out swinging with a slew of
enforcement actions that met little resistance.120
115. Jordan, supranote 72, at 779.
116. Richard H. Walker, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Regulation FD: An
Enforcement Perspective (Nov. 1, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch415.htm.
117. Id
118. See Jordan,supra note 72, at 780-81.
119. Id at 770 (explaining that soon after Regulation FD's enactment a more "businessfriendly" administration provided stronger opposition to the rule, forcing public hearings before
Congress and threatening its continued presence in the SEC's arsenal against insider trading).
120. See id. at 781-96 (discussing the four-action sweep of regulatory actions in 2002); see also
In re Raytheon Co., Exchange Act Release No. 46,897 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Raytheon
Release], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46897.htm (where the SEC alleged that Raytheon
and its chief financial officer ("CFO") selectively disclosed quarterly earnings guidance to sell-side
analysts but not to the public); In re Secure Computing Co., Exchange Act Release No. 46,895
(Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Secure Computing Release], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3446895.htm (where the SEC alleged that Secure and its CEO intentionally disclosed news of a newly
signed deal to an investment advisory firm and only on the following day did they issue a press
release); In re Siebel Sys., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,896 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter
Siebel Systems Release], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46896.htm (where the SEC alleged
that the CEO, after noting in a public conference call that the quarterly results were weak, spoke at a
nonpublic conference and spoke of the optimistic estimate of upcoming business); Report of
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motorola, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 46,898 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Motorola, Inc. Release],
http://www.sec.gov/litigationlinvestreport/34-46898.htm (where the SEC alleged that after the CFO
issued a press release detailing the expected weakness in the company's quarterly earnings, he
personally called fifteen analysts to further explain his statements but did not issue a revised press
release); In re Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461 (Sept. 9, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-48461.htm (where the SEC alleged that although the
company had publically warned of the expected low earnings for the upcoming quarter, the CEO
offered more detailed information to select analysts); In re Seneteck PLC, Exchange Act Release
No. 50,400 (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Seneteck Exchange Act Release], http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/34-50400.htm (where the SEC alleged that the company offered "corrected"
information to analysts and only after those select analysts released their reports did the company
release the information to the public); SEC v. Flowserve Corp., Litigation Release No. 19,154 (Mar.
24, 2005) [hereinafter Flowserve Litigation Release], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lrl9154.htm (where the SEC alleged the CEO affirmed earnings estimates at a private function for
analysts and only several days later did they release the same information to the public). In each of
these actions, the defendants settled with the SEC for varying penalties. Jordan, supra note 72, at
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On November 25, 2002, after several warnings by the press and the
SEC's former Enforcement Director, Richard Walker, that the practice
of corporate selective disclosure would no longer be tolerated,121 the
SEC brought four actions for violations of Regulation FD.122 The first
among this "sweep" 23 of actions targeted Raytheon and its Chief
Financial Officer ("CFO"), Franklyn A. Caine.' 2 4 The action alleged that
the CFO selectively disclosed earnings guidance to sell-side analysts
covering the company.125 During one-on-one calls to analysts, the CFO
offered more detailed information to those selective few, but failed to
notify the public as a whole.126
The SEC explained that the personal one-on-one phone calls,
initiated by the CFO, created discrepancies in information between a
small, select group of individuals and the rest of the trading public,
precisely the situation which Regulation FD was designed to prevent.127
Understanding that the company and its officer had blatantly violated the
new regulation, Raytheon quickly settled, complying with the court's
cease-and-desist order.128
The next action to come amongst this sweep was against Secure
Computing Corporation ("Secure") and its CEO, John McNulty.' 29 The
SEC claimed that on March 6, 2002, in a conference call with a portfolio
manager at an investment advisory firm, the CEO disclosed, against the
wishes of the buyer and without publically announcing that same
information, that his company had entered into a significant sales
contract. 130 The action also claimed that later that day, the CEO
responded to an e-mail from a partner of a brokerage firm and implicitly
confirmed that there had been a deal.131 While Secure's Director of
Investment Relations left a message for the CEO explaining that the
information was nonpublic and should not have been disclosed, the CEO
781-803 (discussing Raytheon, Secure, Siebel, Motorola, and Schering-Plough settlements); see
Seneteck Exchange Act Release, supra (imposing only a cease-and-desist order); Flowserve
Litigation Release, supra(imposing a $350,000 fine on the company and a $50,000 on the CEO).
121. Michael Schroeder, Ratheyon's Disclosure to Analysts Is Investigated WALL ST. J., Mar.
15, 2001 at A3; see SEC Probes PossibleFair Disclosure Violations, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001, at
C5; Richard H. Walker, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the
Rocky Mountain Sec. Conference (May 18, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch492.htm.
122. Jordan, supranote 72, at 781.
123. Id.
124. Id
125. Id. at 781-82; see Raytheon Release, supra note 120.
126. Raytheon Release, supra note 120.
127.

Id.

128. See id.
129. Secure Computing Release, supra note 120.
130. Id
131. Id
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did not receive the message until after the wrongful disclosures.' 3 2
Additionally, on March 7, 2002, the CEO again disclosed the
information while on a conference call to an institutional investor.133 It
was not until several hours later that the company issued a press release
to the public concerning the agreement.1 34
The SEC determined that each disclosure was material and
nonpublic but that the March 6 disclosures were non-intentional and
warranted prompt public disclosure.' 3 5 However, the SEC determined
that the CEO made the March 7 statements intentionally, requiring
Secure to make a simultaneous public disclosure.1 36 The SEC charged
Secure with a violation of Regulation FD for its failure to
simultaneously disclose the information when it intentionally disclosed
material, nonpublic information." Shortly after the SEC initiated its
cease-and-desist proceedings against Secure, the company settled,
yielding to Regulation FD.' 38
The first case to impose monetary sanctions for a violation of
Regulation FD was the SEC's civil action against Siebel Systems, Inc.
("Siebel")."' The complaint alleged that during a public conference call
regarding Siebel's third quarter results, the CEO characterized the
company's upcoming sales as "quite tough through the remainder of the
year." 40 However, at a later, nonpublic conference for select investment
professionals, the CEO informed the small invitation-only assembly that
the company was "optimistic" about the upcoming sales and that they
expected the buying patterns were returning to normal.141 Seibel did not
simultaneously release the CEO's statements to the public at large,
resulting in an SEC investigation.142
The SEC reasoned that because following the CEO's statements at
the nonpublic conference the stock price increased by 16.5% and a
significant number of attendees purchased Siebel stock, the information
that was selectively disclosed was both material and nonpublic.14 3
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Jordan, supranote 72, at 787-88, 790.
140. Siebel Systems Release, supra note 120.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The SEC explained that the information was material because "it significantly altered
the total mix of available information." Id. Also, the SEC placed great emphasis on the purchases by
certain attendees at the conference who were privy to the material, nonpublic information. Id. This
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Furthermore, because the statements were intentional, the failure to
simultaneously disclose the information to the public was a direct
violation of Regulation FD.14 4 Siebel agreed to pay a $250,000 civil
penalty, although they refused to admit or deny the SEC's allegations. 14 5
The action was both initiated and settled in November 2002, signaling to
the nation that Regulation FD was a significant force in the SEC arsenal
against insider trading. 146
Finally, in a surprising decision, but an illustration of the SEC's
limited tolerance for unintentional violations of the new regulation,1 47
the SEC chose to issue a 21(a) Report of Investigation ("Report")
against Motorola, Inc. ("Motorola") instead of initiating an enforcement
proceeding. 14 8 The Report stated that in January and February 2001,
Motorola disclosed to the public that the upcoming quarter sales
estimates would be low due to a "significant" weakness in order input. 149
The company never defined "significant." 50 Based upon this
information, market analysts compiled earnings estimates for the
company. 5 1 However, after reviewing the estimates, Motorola believed
they were too generous and beyond its reach. 152 Fearing Motorola would
be unable to accomplish the estimated sales, the Director of Investor
Relations called fifteen individual analysts to further define what the
company meant by "significant."15 3 Motorola did not simultaneously or
promptly disclose the information to the public. 154
Even though the SEC determined that the information was both
material and selectively disclosed, it did not seek to initiate an action
against Motorola.s55 Instead, the SEC stated that because Motorola
officials had relied in good faith on the instruction of legal counsel, it
would not bring an administrative or civil action against the company.156
The uncontested string of victories allowed the SEC to flex Regulation
emphasis reaffirms the understanding that information that is "material" will alter the market
perception of the security, affecting a market participant's decision to buy, sell, or abstain. See id
144. Id.
145. Jordan, supra note 72, at 787-88.
146. See id. at 787-88, 790.
147. Id. at 792, 795.
148. Motorola,Inc. Release, supranote 120.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. (stating that Motorola's conduct was inconsistent with Regulation FD because the
proper course of action was not to correct information in private but to make the additional
information public).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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FD's muscles and notified the markets that the regulation would be
exercised to its fullest extent.' 57 Unfortunately, at the first sign of
trouble, the SEC's new regulation was put on hold.
III.

PARTY

LINES ARE INSTALLED AGAIN-THE DOWNFALLS OF
REGULATION FD

A. Criticism and Setbacks
Although the SEC quieted most of the concerns that arose from the
release of the proposed Regulation FD, 58 several criticisms regarding
the regulation remained loudly voiced. The persisting criticisms concern
the vague materiality standard of the rule and its effect on dissemination
of information throughout the market as well as market volatility.15 9
Critics throughout the industry, like the Securities Industry Association
("SIA"), feared that the uncertainties advanced by the use of a general

157. Jordan, supra note 72, at 781.
158. The most frequently stated concern regarding the new regulation centers on the "'chilling
effect' it may have on the information dispersed to the public. Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249); see
also E-mail from Michael S. Caccese, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Ass'n for Inv. Mgmt.
& Research, to Jonathan Katz, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Aug. 8, 2000),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/caccesel.htm (expressing the primary concern that
Regulation FD may halt the flow of information from corporations to investors); Letter from Carlos
M. Morales, Merrill Lynch & Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (May 5,
(discussing the risks to
2000), http:/Jwww.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/moralesl.htm
corporations in inadvertently disclosing inappropriate information and the expected reaction to that
fear); E-mail from Sec. Indus. Ass'n, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 6,
2000), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73199/spencerl.htm (advocating against the adoption of
Regulation FD for several reasons, including the potential "chilling effect" such a regulation would
have on the flow of information through the securities markets). The "chilling effect" refers to the
effect on the amount of information a corporation releases as the result of fear of an impending SEC
enforcement action. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,733. After
considering the comments proposed by several concerned market participants, the SEC chose to
modify Regulation FD from its original proposal to protect against inappropriate liability. Id. at
51,718-19. First, the SEC narrowed the scope of the regulation so that it did not apply to all
communications to persons outside the corporation, but just to those that are "reasonably
foreseeable that the security holder will trade on the basis of the information." Id. at 51,718. Second,
in order to ensure that appropriate business communications would not be subject to liability, the
SEC limited the types of issuer personnel covered to only senior management and those who
regularly communicate with market professionals and securities holders. Id. Third, to ensure that
there would be no liability under Rule 1Ob-5, the SEC included an express provision prohibiting the
possibility for violating Rule lOb-5 for non-compliance with Regulation FD. Id. Fourth, to provide
additional assurance that issuers would not be second-guessed on materiality judgments, the SEC
included clear language that the Regulation will only apply to "'knowing or reckless' behavior. Id.
159. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721, 51,733.
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materiality standard as opposed to a more concrete definition would
cause difficulties for market compliance.160
1. The "Materiality" Problem
The practical problem with issuer compliance when imposing a
new regulation results from an inability to determine what would trigger
Regulation FD liability.161 Regulation FD applies to disclosure of
"'material nonpublic' information about the issuer, which could affect
the price of securities. 162 While the SEC has defined "nonpublic" as
information that has not been made available to the general public,"63 the
SEC refused to institute a bright line rule for material information
relying, instead, on the standard developed in recent case law.16 4 Under
Regulation FD, material information is that which "'a reasonable
and has "'a substantial
shareholder would consider important'
likelihood' to alter the mix of information made available.1 65 Many
believe that this reliance on a flexible but ambiguous definition would
lead corporations to choose silence over risking Regulation FD
liability.16 6 Furthermore, critics hypothesize that such a decrease in
information could also have a detrimental effect on the stability of the

market.167
2. Decreased Market Stability
Under Regulation FD, issuers are encouraged to limit information
until it is absolutely required, and then to disseminate information to the

160. See E-mail from Stuart J. Kaswell, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus.
Assoc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 24, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/other/f4-433/kaswelll.htm. SIA felt that the new regulation would severely undermine the
flow of quality information from issuer to investor. Id. SIA warned that Regulation FD would
effectively be imposing a "disclose or abstain" obligation on the issuer, which would have an
inhibiting influence on the necessary disclosure between issuer and analyst. Id.
161. D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street: The SEC's New Regulation FD and Its Impact
on Market Participants,77 IND. L.J. 551, 600 (2002).
162. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721. The SEC acknowledged
that without a bright line rule, decisions regarding materiality would be hard to make. Id. However,
the SEC also stated that using a strict test or exhaustive list of "material" items for the purposes of
Regulation FD would be too inflexible to satisfy the purposes of the new regulation. Id. Instead, in
the eyes of the SEC, Regulation FD would most effectively hinder corporate selective disclosures if
the general materiality standard were used to encompass all possible incidents of corporate
disclosure. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 51,721 & n.38 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc., v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)).
166. Kobi, supra note 161, at 601.
167. Id. at 601-02.
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market as a whole.16 8 While public dissemination does level the
information playing field, critics felt that the absence of guidance
offered by the filtering of information through professional analysts
would cause volatility in prices, acting as a "bombshell on stock
prices."l 69 The argument is that less information to the analysts creates
less accurate earning estimates by those analysts, which in turn creates
more unexpected earning announcements.1 70 The "surprise factor" leads
to greater volatility in stock prices when the actual earnings are

announced.171
Additionally, critics feared that direct dissemination of material
information to the public would result in an inaccurate interpretation of
the corporate information that was once digested by market
professionals before releasing it to the public.1 72 While individual
investors may have access to a greater wealth of information thanks to
Regulation FD, the Regulation cannot ensure that the public will know
what to do with it.173 For example, a corporation might release that they
have decided to raise prices or sell additional stock. An individual
investor could easily interpret such a move as a sign of corporate good
health and vitality while an experienced market analyst would be wary
of and inquire into the reasons behind such a move.' 74 This lack of
market expertise is likely to drag individual investors into injurious
trades and explosive price swings.175
The speculation from a lack of a materiality standard, coupled with
springing from the lessened quality and quantity of
volatility
the
information had critics and issuers calling for help.17 6 It was the federal
courts, not the SEC, that answered the call. 177 While the SEC refused to
concretely establish "material information," the courts finally intervened
and more clearly defined what could be considered "material." 78

168. Id.
169. Id. at 602.
170. Jordan, supra note 72, at 766.
171. Id. Several instances of the increased price volatility include Intel's one-day 22% decline
in stock prices on September 22, 2000, Home Depot's 29% decline on October 12, 2000, and
Globalstar's 60% decline on October 30, 2000. Kobi, supra note 161, at 602.
172. Id. at 603.
173. Id. at 603-04.
174. Id. at 603.
175. Id. at 603-04.
176. See id. at 605 (claiming that Regulation FD has chilled the information flow to the market,
negatively affecting investors).
177. See SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 696, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing
the SEC's complaint against Siebel Systems, Inc.).
178. See id. at 704 (dismissing the complaint for failure to allege selective disclosure of
material, nonpublic information).
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3. Regulation FD Gets Put on Hold
In the early years of its administration, Regulation FD enjoyed a
string of unchallenged enforcement actions, targeting the selective
disclosures that plagued the market.179 The first wave of actions met
little resistance, for each of the companies charged with violating
Regulation FD chose to settle rather than challenge the SEC and its new
regulation in court.80 This winning streak came to a sudden end when
Siebel was charged with a second violation of Regulation FD and the
federal court determined that the SEC had become too severe in its
interpretation of selective disclosure.18 1 In SEC v. Siebel Systems,
Inc.,182 the court dismissed the SEC's complaint and criticized the SEC
for nitpicking and applying a heightened level of scrutiny to defendant
Siebel's disclosures.' 83 The court also echoed the major criticisms of
Regulation FD in its opinion.184
The SEC filed charges against Siebel's CFO and Investor Relations
Director for violating the cease-and-desist order agreed to under the first
enforcement action against the company. 185 The charges alleged that
after public announcements indicating the second quarter sales growth
was due to the "slipped" first quarter sales and not from new sales, the
CFO told attendees at a private institutional investors event that the
company's sales were "'good"' or "'better"' with new deals
developing.18 6 The SEC claimed that these statements were materially
different because the second announcement was "significantly more
positive and upbeat" than the previous statements.' 8 7 The SEC also
alleged that the Investor Relations Director failed to prevent the selective
disclosures or require a public disclosure after the fact.' 8 8 This second
179. See Derek J. Mirza, Comment, Regulation FD: "Nit-Picking" the SEC's Selective
Disclosure Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 881, 885-92 (2006) (describing the early victories in
enforcement actions using Regulation FD against incidents of selective disclosure).
180. See supra Part II.C.
181. See Siebel, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
182. 384 F. Supp. 2d 694.
183. Id. The court refused to accept the SEC's argument that the selective disclosures of the
"good" or "better" state of Siebel's business activity levels and the "building" or "growing" sales
pipeline were materially different from prior public disclosures. Id. at 697, 705.
184. See id at 701-02 (explaining the "'chilling effect"' Regulation FD has on the information
flow in the market and the vagueness of the regulation stemming from an undefined materiality and
nonpublic standard).
185. SEC Charges Siebel Systems, Inc. with Second Violation of Regulation FD; Siebel's CFO
and Former Investor Relations Director Charged with Aiding and Abetting Violations, Litigation
Release No. 18,766 (June 29, 2004) [hereinafter Siebel Litigation Release], http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/lrl 8766.htm.
186. Siebel, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
187. Id. at 698.
188. Siebel Litigation Release, supra note 185.
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action against Siebel charged the individual corporate officers with a
civil suit and offered an opportunity for companies and the court to
challenge the SEC and what was considered an overbearing
regulation. 189
The court began by reiterating the frequently criticized potential
"'chilling effect"' Regulation FD has on the market as a result of the
vague materiality standard.' 90 The court discussed how executives' fear
of liability from a "'post hoc assessment that disclosed information was
material"' would cause a decrease in information, generally, to the
public. 191 The court also referred to the increased volatility stemming
from the limited information flow to the market.' 92 Finally, the court
criticized the SEC for its refusal to define materiality. 93 However, the
court did note that the SEC attempted to remedy the vague materiality
standard by enumerating seven categories of information that would
most likely be considered material. 194
The SEC's refusal to limit materiality by creating a more concrete
definition in an attempt to cast a larger net to a bigger group of selective
disclosures thus backfired. 195 The agency's overly aggressive
interpretation of its own rule mixed with an excessively flexible
materiality standard forced the court to dismiss the action against Siebel
and its executives.' 9 6 The court stated that the SEC had scrutinized each
word in both statements "at an extremely heightened level," 1 9 7 including
verb tense and syntax of each sentence in an attempt to find materially

189. See Siebel, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
190. Id. at 701-02 (quoting Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249)).
191. Id. at 701 (quoting Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,733).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 701-03 (although the SEC acknowledged that determinations of materiality were
difficult and it was mindful of the burdens on issuers, it still refused to concretely define
"material"). Even while acknowledging the difficulties presented to issuers by Regulation FD, the
SEC blindly suggested that in most cases the materiality would be clear. Id.
194. Id. at 702. The seven enumerated categories are:
(1) Earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or
changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers
or supplies... ; (4) changes in control or in management; (5) change in auditors or
auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an auditor's audit report; (6)
events regarding the issuer's securities . . ; and (7) bankruptcies and receiverships.
Id. While the list offered guidance to issuers and market participants, it was not considered by the
SEC to be per se material. Id.
195. See id. at 708. The court noted that, "[a]pplying Regulation FD in an overly aggressive
manner cannot effectively encourage full and complete public disclosure of facts reasonably
deemed relevant to investment decisionmaking." Id.
196. Id. at 708-09.
197. Id at 704.
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different information.' 9 8 This approach, the court explained, had no
foundation in the regulation itself.199 Instead the appropriate standard is
'"[flair accuracy, not perfection."' 2 00 Furthermore, the court found it
particularly significant that the information disclosed did not fit
"squarely within the seven enumerated categories listed by the
SEC ... as being more likely to be considered material." 20 1 For these
reasons, the court determined that the SEC applied its new regulation in
an "overly aggressive manner." 202
Since its public scolding, the SEC became much more conservative
in pleading Regulation FD violations, resulting in the regulation being
rarely enforced.203 That said, in 2005 the SEC chose to bring an
enforcement action against Flowserve for selectively disclosing
information to a small group of institutional investors.204 The SEC
2 05
and
charged the CEO with a violating § 13(a) of the 1934 Act
206
The complaint alleged that the CEO of Flowserve
Regulation FD.
selectively disclosed information explicitly reaffirming earnings
guidance, thus the SEC stayed conservatively within the bounds of the
specifically enumerated categories of material information within which
the Siebel Court suggested that the SEC remain.207
The SEC continued to be hesitant and conservative in pleading
Regulation FD in actions through 2009, when it brought an action
against Christopher A. Black, the CFO of American Commercial Lines,
Inc. The SEC alleged that Black sent a personal e-mail to eight sell-side
analysts providing additional details about a public statement made in
June 2007.208 That e-mail told the select analysts that the new earnings
estimates would be "'about a dime below that of the first quarter"' but
he did not publically disclose the information. 20 9 Although information
198. Id.
199. Id
200. Id at 705 (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1200
(2d Cir. 1978)).
201. Id. at 708.
202. Id
203. See Michael L. Davitt et al., SEC Renews Focus on Regulation FD, MARTINDALECOM
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.martindale.com/securities-law/articleJones-Day 951320.htm (noting
that there were practically no formal actions alleging violations of Regulation FD after 2005).
204. Flowserve Litigation Release, supra note 120.
205. Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act requires an issuer to file appropriate documents with the
SEC to keep information regarding the company reasonably current. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006).
206. Flowserve Litigation Release, supra note 120.
207. Amended Complaint at 3, SEC v. Flowserve Corp., No. 1:05CV00612(JR) (D.D.C. Apr.
19, 2005); see Seibel, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
208. In re Black, Exchange Act Release No. 60,715 (Sept. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Black
Administrative Release], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60715.pdf.
209. Id.
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regarding earnings estimates is a clear example of material information,
the SEC chose to simply settle the case for a meager $25,000-half the
$50,000 fine sought in the Flowserve action four years earliersuggesting a lessening of the SEC's faith in Regulation FD.210
Additionally, for the first time since the implementation of Regulation
FD, the SEC chose not to file an action against the corporation as well as
the offending executive officer.2 11
Perhaps the most telling example of the SEC's increased hesitancy
to plead a Regulation FD violation occurred in early 2010 involving
State Street Bank and Trust Company ("State Street").212 The allegations
described blatant selective disclosure of material, nonpublic information
to a select group of investors and yet the SEC did not charge the
company with a violation of Regulation FD. 2 13 The SEC alleged that
State Street sold bonds it claimed were part of an "'enhanced cash"'
fund.214 However, by 2007 the fund was almost completely invested in
subprime lending investments.2 15 Beginning on July 26, 2007, when the
perils of subprime lending were surfacing, State Street sent out a series
of communications describing how other investments would be effected,
not bothering to inform its investors of State Street's own involvement
in the subprime market.216 At the same time, however, State Street
informed several select investors of the fund's subprime concentration,

210. Id.; see also Flowserve Litigation Release, supra note 120 (only four years before the
administrative proceeding against Black, who sent personal e-mails directly to individual analysts,
the SEC inflicted twice the monetary fine against Flowserve's CEO for simply reaffirming a prior
earnings statement).
211. Black Administrative Release, supra note 208 (the order named only Black). Although the
SEC has brought two enforcement actions for violations of Regulation FD in 2010, the Commission
has continued to bring actions only for behavior clearly in violation of Regulation FD and has
settled both of these actions for a minimal amount. See SEC Files Regulation FD Charges Against
Presstek, Inc. and Its Former CEO, Litigation Release No. 21,443 (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr2l443.htm (the SEC settled charges against Presstek
for a mere $400,000 where the company was accused of disclosing material nonpublic information
regarding Presstek's financial performance to a managing partner of an investment adviser); see
also In re Office Depot, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 63,152 (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2010/34-63152.pdf (announcing the settlement of the SEC
enforcement action against Office Depot, Inc. for $1 million, where the allegations stated that the
company made one-on-one calls to analysts to encourage a change in estimates).
212. See SEC Charges State Street for Misleading Investors About Subprime Mortgage
Investments, Litigation Release No. 21,408 (Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter State Street Litigation
Release], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr2l408.htm.
213. See id.
214. Complaint at 2, SEC v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., No. 1-10-CV-10172 (D. Mass. Feb. 4,
2010) [hereinafter State Street Complaint].
215. Id.
216. Id.
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thus giving them preferential treatment. 17 Those select investors were
able to recover their investments from the bonds while the other
investors suffered when the subprime market collapsed in 2008.218
Paradoxically, even though the SEC referred to State Street's
actions as "selective disclosure" 2 19 it charged State Street only with
violations of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 220 After adopting Regulation FD to
address the specific problem of selective disclosure, the SEC has
seemingly ceased to enforce it or embrace the rule to its fullest extent.
Instead, the SEC relies on other areas of the federal securities laws with
which it has had less resistance, conceivably to better ensure a
victory. 221 Perhaps the SEC rightfully withdrew its support from
Regulation FD because, in light of the Cuban case, the regulation has
inadvertently provided a shield for CEO's and companies who
selectively disclose, effectively making the regulation impotent.222
B. Reinforcing the Party Lines-RegulationFD Shields Selective
Disclosures
By prohibiting a source from divulging material, nonpublic
information to outsiders, Regulation FD sought to prevent those privy to
the information from making a profit or avoiding a loss at the expense of
the trading public.223 However, with the intention of making Regulation
FD more attuned with the demands of ordinary business, the SEC
offered several exceptions to the general rule.224 The result of one of
these exceptions was, in essence, to create a shield behind which
selectively disclosing issuers and executives can hide.

217. Id.
218. Id. at 3; see Katie Zezima, State Street Gave Some ofIts Clients Better Data,N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2010, at B3.
219. State Street Litigation Release, supra note 212; see Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges
State Street for Misleading Investors About Subprime Mortgage Investments (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-21.htm.
220. State Street Complaint, supra note 214, at 17-18. Section 17 of the 1933 Act makes it
unlawful for any person to obtain money or property in the sale or offer of a security through the use
of untrue statements of material fact, omissions of material fact, or devices of fraud or deceit. 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)-(3) (2006).
221. Compare State Street Litigation Release, supra note 211 (the defendant settled for over
$300 million for a violation of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act), with SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp.
2d 694,696, 701-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (the SEC was unable to prove a violation of Regulation FD).
222. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 728 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551
(5th Cir. 2010).
223. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
224. Id at 51,719-20.
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Rule 100(b)(2) of Regulation FD offers an exception for selective
disclosure of material, nonpublic information to anyone (even investors
likely to trade on the information) who "expressly agree[] to maintain
the disclosed information in confidence." 2 2 5 This exemption was
included in the final rule in response to the criticism that if Regulation
FD applied to "'any person' outside the issuer," it would obstruct the
ordinary communication needed to conduct business and have a
"'chilling effect"' on the information dispersed to the market.22 6 The
industry feared that such a prohibition would "inappropriately interfere
with ordinary-course business communications with parties such as
customers, suppliers, strategic planners, and government regulators."22 7
In order to appease the critics and avoid any negative consequences, the
SEC limited the scope of Regulation FD so that it did not extend to
communications with persons who have agreed to keep the information
in confidence. 22 8 Thus, any issuer or officer will not be subjected to
liability regardless of what information is disclosed and to whom, as
229
long as they obtain an explicit confidentiality agreement.
The SEC mistakenly believed that this exception would not
diminish the regulation's effectiveness because any misuse of such
information would give rise to liability under the misappropriation
230
Under the misappropriation theory, a person violates section
theory.
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 when he misappropriates confidential information
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities in violation of a
duty owed to the source of the information.23 1 Selectively disclosed
information subject to this exception would have a duty of
confidentiality attached, which if violated would subject the party using
the information to insider trading liability.23 2 The SEC believed that
potential liability would deter exploitation of the selectively disclosed
information, protecting the trading public from potential insider
trading.233 However, in light of the Cuban case, the breach of a

225. 17 C.F.R. §243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2009); see also Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations:
Regulation FD, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/
regfd-interp.htm (last updated June 4, 2010) (explaining that if an issuer receives a confidentiality
agreement, it does not need an agreement not to trade).
226. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,718-20.
227. Id. at 51,719.
228. Id. at 51,720 & n.29.
229. See id. at 51,720.
230. Id.
231. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
232. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,720.
233. Id at 51,720 n.27.
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confidentiality agreement alone will not trigger insider trading liability
under the misappropriation theory.234
In 2009, the SEC brought an action against a private investor, Mark
Cuban, under the misappropriation theory of insider trading.2 35 The
complaint stated Cuban was the largest known shareholder of a company
called Mamma.com at the time of his alleged insider trading.236 The
SEC alleged that on June 28, 2004, Mamma.com CEO, Guy Faure,
contacted Cuban to invite him to participate in the Private Investment in
Public Equity ("PIPE") offering. 237 The CEO claimed he told Cuban he
had information to convey but the information would need to remain
confidential.238 Once Cuban agreed to maintain the information in
confidence, the CEO divulged material information regarding the PIPE
offering. 239 Cuban was upset over the possible diluting of shares the
PIPE offering posed, but understanding insider trading laws to some
allegedly told the CEO: "'Well, now I'm screwed. I can't
extent, he
0

sell."'

24

Nevertheless, several hours after the CEO disclosed the information
regarding the PIPE offering, Cuban allegedly called his broker to unload
his entire 600,000 share holdings. 24 1 After Cuban released his holdings,
Mamma.com formally announced the offering to the public. 24 2 The
company's stock saw a 9.3% decrease in value by the end of the trading
day. 2 43 According to the complaint, Cuban's fortuitous position as a
leading shareholder, which allowed him to be privy to material,
nonpublic information, helped him avoid $750,000 in losses. 24 4

234. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551
(5th Cir. 2010) (separating the duty of confidentiality from the duty not to trade); see also Abbe L.
Dienstag et al., Texas District Court Dismisses Insider Trading ChargesAgainst Mark Cuban and
Holds that Misappropriation Theory Requires Duty Not to Trade, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS.,
Oct. 2009, at 38, 38, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdfl2009/October/38.pdf
(explaining that a finding that the duty to not trade is separate from the duty of confidentiality
undermines the "spirit and purpose of Regulation FD (if not its letter)").
235. See SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Mark Cuban, Litigation Release No.
20,810 (Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Cuban Litigation Release], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2008/lr208 I0.htm.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 718.
242. Id.
243. Cuban Litigation Release, supra note 235.
244. Id.
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The SEC brought an action against Cuban for insider trading based
upon the misappropriation theory. 245 The SEC argued that Cuban's
agreement to keep the information confidential created a duty, which
246
gave rise to liability under the misappropriation theory.
Demonstrating the confusing and illusory nature of the misappropriation
theory in practice,24 7 the court stated that while a duty of trust or
confidence can be created by a confidentiality agreement, there exists no
insider trading liability when a non-fiduciary, like Cuban, does not also
agree to refrain from trading on the confidential information or
otherwise misappropriating it for personal gain.248 According to the
district court, Cuban agreed to keep the information confidential but
made no other representations to Mamma.com's CEO. 24 9 He never
expressly agreed to not trade on the information he received and so the
court dismissed the action against him. 2 50 The court separated the duty
of confidentiality from the duty not to trade for the purposes of the
misappropriation theory. 251 As a result of this ruling, CEOs are free to

245. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717. Under the misappropriation theory, a person violates
Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 when he misappropriates confidential information in connection to the
purchase or sale of securities. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
246. Dienstag et al., supra note 234, at 38.
247. See Michael G. Capeci, Note, SEC Rule 10b5-2: A Callfor Revitalizing the Commission's
Efforts in the War on Insider Trading,37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 805, 821-22, 824 (2009) (discussing the
confusing effects of the piecemeal rule making and case law surrounding the misappropriation
theory); see also David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critiqueof the MisappropriationTheory
ofInsider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 41, 77-80 (1998) (acknowledging the vague parameters of
the misappropriation theory created in O'Hagan, which leads to confusion and unpredictable
enforcement).
248. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725, 728. The court explained:
A person who receives material, nonpublic information may in fact preserve the
confidentiality of that information while simultaneously using it for his own gain.
Indeed, the nature of insider trading is such that one who trades on material, nonpublic
information refrains from disclosing that information to the other party to the securities
transaction.
Id. at 725.
249. Id. at 728. The SEC attempted to rely on the telephone call where Cuban stated, "'Well,
now I'm screwed. I can't sell,"' to show that he entered into an agreement to satisfy the duty
necessary for the misappropriation theory of liability. Id. The court chose to understand this
statement as an expression of his belief at that instant that it would be unlawful for him to sell his
shares on the basis of the information he had just been provided. Id. The court explained that the
statement could not "reasonably be understood as an agreement not to sell." Id. Furthermore, the
court explained that the fact that the CEO of Mamma.com expected that Cuban would not sell based
on the material, nonpublic information is also insufficient to establish an agreement not to sell. Id.
("[A] mere unilateral expectation on the part of the information source-one that is not based on the
other party's agreement to refrain from trading on the information-cannot create the predicate duty
for misappropriation theory liability.").
250. Id. at 727-28, 731.
251. Id. at 725.
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disclose any material, nonpublic information to select investors who may
then trade on such information without the fear of liability on either end.
The exemption offered by Rule 100(b)(2) acts to protect any issuer,
officer, or director who selectively discloses information from liability
for a violation of Regulation FD, as long as they first obtain a
confidentiality agreement. 252 By distinguishing the duty of
confidentiality from the duty not to trade, the confidentiality agreement
exception has become an ineffective measure against preventing insider
trading.2 53 As the court in Cuban explained, the duty of confidentiality
will not invoke a duty needed to impose liability under the
misappropriation theory.254 If a duty is not created for the purposes of
the misappropriation theory, a confidentiality agreement will not
discourage a party who has obtained material, nonpublic information
through selective disclosure to trade on that information. Thus, a CEO
wishing to gain favor with a particular investor can avoid liability under
Regulation FD through the use of a confidentiality agreement and the
investor, although in breach of the confidentiality agreement, can trade
on that information and not be subjected to liability for insider trading.
Regulation FD, in its current state, has effectively shielded from liability
those it originally sought to expose.2 55
While the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently
reversed the decision of the district court,256 it did so by finding the
dialogue between Cuban and the CEO contained an express agreement
not to trade on the confidential information; leaving undisturbed the
question of separating the duty not to trade from the duty of
confidentiality. Yet the question still remains: Why not plug the leak at
the source?
Neither the court nor the complaint addressed the conspicuously
missing names under Cuban's as co-defendants, Mamma.com and Guy
Faure,257 even though the corporation and the CEO were instrumental in

252. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2009).
253. See Dienstag et al., supra note 234, at 38 (explaining that the court doubts the legitimacy
of insider trading violations predicated on the basis of a pre-existing agreement to hold information
confidential).
254. See Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
255. See id.; see also Dienstag et al., supra note 234, at 38 (explaining that a finding that the
duty not to trade is separate from the duty of confidentiality undermines the "spirit and purpose of
Regulation FD (if not its letter)").
256. SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2010). The Fifth Circuit held that because all
circumstances surrounding the selective disclosure suggest that the understanding between the
defendant and Mamma.com was that he would not trade on the selectively disclosed information,
this creates a duty, which will sustain a claim under the misappropriation theory. Id. at 557-58.
257. See Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717-18, 731; see Cuban Complaint, supra note 6, at 1-3.
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Cuban's alleged insider trading violations.258 Furthermore, the actions of
the CEO and the corporation in failing to immediately remedy the
disclosure looked to be blatant violations of Regulation FD.259 Several
critics believe that this failure to implicate other defendants was a result
of overzealous SEC officials searching for the big headlines and big
name defendants.260 A more reasonable and sympathetic explanation is
that the SEC could not charge Mamma.com or its CEO for violating
Regulation FD because Regulation FD, in its current state, provides a
loophole for companies or senior management to divulge material,
nonpublic information to select individuals at their discretion, with no
threat of liability. 26 1
The SEC specifically targeted selective disclosure because of the
detrimental effect the practice has had on investor confidence in the
market.2 62 By adopting Regulation FD, the SEC sought to end selective
disclosure and "level [the] playing field" for all investors.2 63 However,
while attempting to appease the corporate industry, the SEC
inadvertently created a loophole that, in light of recent circumstances,
has made the regulation moribund.2 64 Nonetheless, selective disclosure

258. If not for the information Cuban received from the CEO, he would not have known to
trade prior to the public release of the impending PIPE offering. See Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 71718.
259. See supra Part II.B.2.
Trial of Mark Cuban,
The Coming Bizarre Show
Wenzel,
260. Robert
ECONOMICPOLICYJOURNAL.COM (Nov. 24, 2008, 12:17 AM), http://www.economicpolicyjournal.
com/2008/11 /coming-bizarre-show-trial-of-mark-cuban.html. Prior to Cuban's indictment, the SEC
was investigating Mamma.com concerning its involvement in the alleged insider trading committed
by Cuban. Id. Mamma.com issued a press release stating a previously informal SEC investigation
had been converted into a formal investigation. See Jim Hedger, Mamma.com Under Formal SEC
Investigation, SEARCH ENGINE J., http://www.searchenginejournal.com/mammacom-under-formalsec-investigation/1577 (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). The release also included a statement by the
company explaining that it believes the SEC is looking into matters related to the trading of the
company's securities and whether "'an individual"' acted in concert with members of the company.
Id. However, the investigation came to a sudden end just prior to the deposition of Mamma.com's
CEO, Guy Faure, regarding Cuban's actions. Wenzel, supra.
261. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2009). That section of Regulation FD states:
"Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to a disclosure made ... [t]o a person who expressly
agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence ..... Id.
262. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,605 (proposed Dec. 28,
1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
263. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).

264. See id. at 51,720; see also Dienstag et al., supra note 234, at 38 (stating that the decision
in the Cuban case, differentiating an agreement to keep information confidential from an agreement
not to trade on the information, is directly at odds with Regulation FD, which only applies to
disclosures where it is reasonably foreseeable the person will purchase or sell the issuer's
securities).
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still poses a threat to a fair and efficient securities market 265 and so
Regulation FD, if amended, could once again be an effective arrow in
the SEC's quiver against insider trading.
IV.

How To RESTORE REGULATION FD To DISCONNECT THE PARTY
LINE

A. ProposedAmendments to Regulation FD
In order to once again make Regulation FD an effective means to
deter selective disclosure and the potential for subsequent insider
trading, this Note suggests three alterations to Regulation FD. First, the
SEC must sacrifice its vague, albeit flexible, materiality standard 266 for a
more clearly defined set of material disclosures. Second, the exemption
offered in Rule 100(b)(2) for selective disclosures attached to
confidentiality agreementS267 must be abandoned. Finally, liability for
violating Regulation FD should be extended to those who receive the
information in addition to those who disclose it.
The SEC's growing hesitancy to plead Regulation FD arose after
the court in Siebel reprimanded the SEC for its overly broad
interpretation of its own rule.268 While the SEC's intentions were to
expand the application of Regulation FD,269 its vague materiality
standard prevented the Regulation from being effectively plead. 270 The
court in Siebel noted that the SEC would be more successful in pleading
Regulation FD if it remained within the seven enumerated examples of
what the SEC considered "material" items.27 1

265. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation ofAnalysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1090 (2003) (stating that selective disclosures enable
management to buy institutional investor compliance, allowing those investors to profit at the
expense of other traders).
266. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
267. 17 C.F.R. §243.100(b)(2) (2009).
268. See SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); supra Part
III.A.3.
269. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721. The SEC explained that
it was hesitant to establish a bright line rule for materiality because it believed Regulation FD would
not encompass the various types of selective disclosure that plague the securities market; instead, a
general material standard would "encompass the necessary flexibility to fit the circumstances of
each case." id.
270. See Siebel, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
271. Id.
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In its final release of Regulation FD, the SEC listed seven
categories of information that it would most likely consider material.272
These are:
(1) Earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint
ventures or changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or
developments regarding customers or suppliers . . ; (4) changes in
control or in management; (5) change in auditors or auditor
notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an auditor's audit
report; (6) events regarding the issuer's securities .. .; and
(7) bankruptcies or receiverships. 273
The SEC noted that it was hesitant to establish a bright line rule for
materiality as a general rule would encompass the necessary flexibility,
casting a bigger net, required for securities regulation.2 74 However, the
SEC should sacrifice casting a bigger net in order to actually catch fish.
If the SEC limits what it considered material disclosures to the seven
categories, the courts would be more receptive to Regulation FD
pleadings, allowing the SEC to more confidently rely on the regulation
to deter selective disclosure.
The second alteration would eliminate Regulation FD's exemption
for material, nonpublic information disclosed to a person "who expressly
agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence." 275 While
this clause was originally included to protect communications necessary
to everyday business, it has removed any potential liability for insiders
committing corporate favoritism and, in light of the circumstances of the
Cuban case, has rendered the regulation innocuous in ultimately
preventing insider trading.276 With this exemption, insiders are free to
disclose any information to preferred investors, who may then avoid the
risk of insider liability through the procurement of a confidentiality
277
By removing the exemption, Regulation FD will reinstate
agreement.
liability for selectively disclosing insiders who divulge information to
gain favor with investors and deter future incidents of insider trading,
plugging the leak before it has the potential to do any harm.
Additionally, there exists no practical reason for the inclusion of
this exemption. The exemption was instituted to protect ordinary

272. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,721.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2009).
276. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 727-28 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551
(5th Cir. 2010).
277. See supra Part II.B.
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business communications from triggering liability 27 8 but such
communications are protected by the other limitations to the scope of
Regulation FD incorporated into the rule. 27 9 Regulation FD expressly
does not extend to disclosures to persons such as attorneys, investment
bankers, accountants, and those in connection with a securities
offering. 280 The regulation only applies to broker-dealers, investment
advisers, investment companies, and holders of the issuer's securitiespersons that are likely to trade on the information. 2 81 Even without the
exception for disclosures to a person who agrees to maintain the
information in confidence, Regulation FD would continue to protect
legitimate communications without inadvertently protecting corporate
favoritism.
The third alteration would impose liability for those on the
receiving end of selectively disclosed information. Regulation FD
sought to prevent the disclosure of material, nonpublic information so
that the potential for insider trading could not be realized.28 2 By
imposing liability on the recipients of information, Regulation FD can
more effectively prevent disclosure of information to persons likely to
trade on it. Not only will insiders be deterred from disclosing
information but also potential recipients will be encouraged to "hang up
the phone."
With these amendments, the relevant portions of the general rule
would read as follows:
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses
any material, nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its
securities to any person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section,
the issuer and person who received the material, nonpublic

information shall make public disclosure of that information:
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
(b)(2) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to a disclosure
made:

278. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249).
279. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b).
280. Id. §243. 100(b)(2); see also Removal From Regulation FD of the Exemption For Credit
Rating Agencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,050, 61,050 (Oct. 4, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243)
(removing the exemption for disclosures made to credit rating agencies).
281. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1).
282. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,716.
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i. To a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the
issuer (such as an attorney, investment banker, or accountant);
or
ii. In connection with a securities offering registered under the
Securities Act ....
Through the past decade, the SEC has focused its efforts to curb
insider trading on the misappropriation theory, often with little
success. 2 8 3 The amended and consequently enhanced rule can redirect
the SEC's efforts toward the prevention of insider trading through the
regulation of selective disclosure. By reinstating liability for those
insiders who selectively disclose information and creating liability for
those who receive the information, the SEC can stop the conversation at
both ends of the party line.
B. Cases Where Regulation FD Could Have Been (andShould Be)
Employed
Often the temptation for headlines and large fines associated with
the misappropriation theory entices the SEC away from using
Regulation FD in its fight against insider trading.284 However, this
reliance and faith in the post-trade actions can easily leave the SEC
without a victory.285 The following cases exemplify how the SEC could
ensure a victory using the amended Regulation FD.
First, the revised Regulation FD would have proved more effective
against the blatant corporate favoritism illustrated in the facts
surrounding the Cuban case than the use of the misappropriation theory
of insider trading. 2 86 As suggested by the complaint in the Cuban case,
the CEO was not held liable for violating Regulation FD based upon the
confidentiality agreement between the company and the investor and yet,

283. Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 247, at 44, 57 (explaining that the SEC relies heavily on
the misappropriation theory for the punishment and prevention of insider trading); see also Ted
Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis, Regulatory Loopholes, and
Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with Insider Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 357, 376-77, 391-92 (discussing the limitations of the misappropriation theory in equity and
debt securities); Rebecca S. Smith, Note, O'Hagan Revisited. Should a Fiduciary Duty Be Required
Under the Misappropriation Theory?, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1018-19, 1025-26 (2006)
(discussing cases where the SEC failed to establish the necessary elements under the
misappropriation theory).
284. See William J. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV.
863, 897-98 (1987) (explaining that insider trading generates headlines and notoriety for the SEC).
285. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 731 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551
(5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
286. See Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 717-18.
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insider trading occurred, to the detriment of the market.2 87 Although the
court of appeals has upheld the insider trading liability for investors who
trade on selectively disclosed information, it has done so only where the
particular circumstances establish an accepted duty not to trade.288 If the
suggested alterations to Regulation FD are adopted, the SEC would no
longer need to rely on the unreliable misappropriation theory to attempt
to curb this specific behavior.
Under the revised regulation, the CEO would have been liable for a
violation of Regulation FD for disclosing information to a preferred
investor. The absolute threat of liability likely would have deterred the
CEO from making the call. Additionally, imposing liability for receiving
such information without an immediate disclosure would have put the
plaintiff in Cuban on notice to "hang up the phone." By strictly
prohibiting the information from being disclosed, Regulation FD could
have prevented the subsequent insider trading. Thus, regardless of the
outcome in the Fifth Circuit, an improved Regulation FD will ease the
SEC's fight against insider trading by fortifying the prohibition against
selective disclosure.
Another situation where Regulation FD, in its revised form, would
289
In
have prevented insider trading occurred in United States v. Kim.
2002, the SEC brought an action against Keith Joon Kim for violations
of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 under the misappropriation
theory of insider trading. 29 0 Kim had attended a social gathering for
young CEO's where he received material, nonpublic information
regarding a potential merger.29 Although the meeting required attendees
to comply with a written confidentiality agreement, Kim allegedly
purchased shares of one of the companies engaged in the merger
discussions.292 When news of the merger was disclosed to the public, the
price of the shares increased dramatically, making a substantial profit for
Kim. 2 93 The SEC argued that Kim violated a duty of trust and
confidence owed to the other attendees at the meeting.294 However, the
court held that an express confidentiality agreement does not provide the
basis for the misappropriation theory.2 95 The court further explained that

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See supra Part II.B.
Cuban, 620 F.3d at 557-58.
184 F. Supp. 2d 1006.
Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1008-09.
Id. at 1009.
Id
Id.at 1015.
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the agreement only applies to ethics and morality and, without setting
forth a fiduciary duty, does not give rise to any legal duties.29 6
This is a manifest example where material, nonpublic information
was disclosed under the protection of a confidentiality agreement and
insider trading occurred as a result of that disclosure.29 7 Information
regarding a merger is within the seven categories of "'material' items"
listed by the SEC and so this disclosure would come clearly within the
purview of Regulation FD.298 Had the CEOs at the meeting thought they
would be held liable for a violation of Regulation FD, they would not
have disclosed the information regarding the potential merger and Kim
would not have had an opportunity to trade on that information.
Additionally, the revised Regulation FD would impose a duty on Kim to
disclose the information once he received it or be liable for a violation of
the regulation per se.
Finally, if the SEC were to institute this revised Regulation FD it
would be applicable to hedge funds, where the government is currently
seeking greater regulation in an effort to better protect the securities
markets as a whole.299 Hedge funds are currently hardly regulated, if at
all. 3 00 They are exempt from regulation by both the 1933 ACt301 and the
Investment Company Act of 1940.302 In recent years the SEC has
concluded that the potential for fraud in combination with hedge funds'
significant role in the securities markets required a revision of the hedge
fund rules.303 Due to the fact that hedge funds are not required to
296. Id.
297. See id. at 1008-09.
298. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249). The second material item listed includes mergers as well
as acquisitions and tender offers. Id.
299. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS AND MARKET
PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT CONTINUED ACTION

IS NEEDED 1-4 (2008) [hereinafter GAO: HEDGE FUNDS], available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d08200.pdf (explaining the government's recent interest in regulating private hedge
funds).
300. See id at 9.
301. The 1933 Act includes an exemption from registering for "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006). Additionally, Regulation D provides an
exemption from the disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act to issuers who refrain from general
solicitation and only issue to "accredited investor[s]." 17 C.F.R. §230.506(a) (2009). Thus, as long
as hedge funds use only private methods of issuing securities and only to select investors, they are
not required to comply with the 1933 Act. See id
302. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 I. Hedge funds also escape regulation under the Investment
Company Act because they are excluded from the definition of an "investment company." Id. § 80a3(c)(7)(A). Under this section, small, private offerings do not require federal regulation. Id.; see also
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (holding that certain persons "who are shown
to be able to fend for themselves" fall outside the intended scope of established regulations).
303.

Div. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
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disclose their holdings, there is vast potential for fraudulent activity,
including insider trading through the use of selectively disclosed
information.3 04 However, the SEC's past efforts to regulate hedge funds
have been generally unsuccessful. 305
Hedge funds remain a major influence in securities markets and
their actions, especially their fraudulent actions, have a significant
impact on the market as a whole.306 In its revised form, Regulation FD
will lessen the opportunity for hedge funds to participate in fraudulent
activity by imposing liability for both disclosing and receiving material,
nonpublic information. Regulation FD, as originally adopted, applied to
selective disclosures to hedge funds.30 7 Under the revised rule, hedge
funds would be required to simultaneously or promptly disclose any
material, nonpublic information they received, thus removing the
potential for subsequent insider trading on that information. Regulation
FD can provide an avenue through which the SEC cannot only curb
insider trading in its already regulated securities, but expand to new
areas of regulation, reducing the opportunity for and occurrences of
insider trading.
V.

CONCLUSION

The SEC has hardly been winning the war on insider trading.30 8
Even after fashioning the immense patchwork of case law litigated in
defense of the misappropriation theory, corporate favoritism and insider
FUNDS 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf; Registration
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Funds Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056-57 (Dec. 10,
2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) (discussing the increase in hedge fund related fraud).
304. See Guttenberg, Litigation Release No. 20,022 (Mar. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Guttenberg
Litigation Release], http://www.sec.gov/litigation/itreleases/2007/lr20022.htm (discussing insider
trading charges against Wall Street professionals who traded material, nonpublic information to a
hedge fund adviser in exchange for kickbacks).
305. In 2004, the SEC enacted a new rule whereby hedge fund managers would be required to
register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Funds Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. at 72,054. However, courts have ultimately found no
justification for the rule stating that there was no connection between the number of investors in a
fund and the underlying policy of the SEC's rule, which was to mitigate the national impact of
hedge funds. See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 883-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
306. GAO: HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 299, at 16-18 (discussing the numerous incidents of
fraud in hedge fund management).
307. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(iii) (2009). Rule 100(b)(1)(iii) applies to hedge funds by
requiring public disclosure of entities who would be defined as investment companies but for the
exclusions set forth in Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. Id.
308. See Capeci, supra note 247, at 821-22, 824 (discussing patchwork litigation and rule
making surrounding the misappropriation theory); see also Kamman & Hood, supra note 283, at
376-77 (explaining the limitations of the misappropriation theory with respect to certain
disclosures).
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trading persists.309 While the SEC may have had several large victories,
the headlines and fines are simply not deterring unfair behavior. 31 0 This
focus on punishing the act after it has already been committed is not
effectively reaching the goals of the insider trading prohibitionincreased investor confidence in the fairness of the market.3 11 Instead, a
focus on prevention of the bad act as opposed to the act itself will lessen
the opportunities for outsiders to trade on material, nonpublic
information and thus promote the overall goals of the securities laws.312
A reinvigorated Regulation FD will refocus the SEC's efforts on
preventing insider trading by requiring both parties to the conversation
to disclose the material, nonpublic information or face liability for
failure to do so. However, in its current state, Regulation FD is not
preventing selective disclosures; rather, it is promoting them. By using
an altered, but already established, Regulation FD, the SEC can more
effectively combat insider trading, thus increasing investor confidence
and promoting the goals of the insider trading prohibition. The adjusted
regulation will tell insiders to "shut up" and outsiders to "hang up"effectively ending the party line.
Kristen A. Truver *

309. See Brodsky & Kramer, supra note 247, at 79-80 (arguing that the current case law
surrounding the misappropriation theory has led to insufficient guidance for market participants as
to what can or cannot be done with material, nonpublic information); see, e.g., SEC v. Cuban, 634
F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010).
310. See GuttenbergLitigation Release, supranote 304.
311. Spencer Derek Klein, Note, Insider Trading, SEC Decision-Making, and the Calculus of
Investor Confidence, 16 HOFSTRA L. REv. 665, 666-68 (1988). Klein argues that there is misplaced
confidence in the nexus between investor confidence and insider trading prosecutions and that there
are, instead, numerous factors that instill investor confidence. Id. at 673-74.
312. See North, supranote 14, at 331 ("[M]arket fairness is most commonly linked to concepts
of informational parity, equality of access to information, minimization of fraud, investor
protection, and investor confidence in the integrity of the market.").
* J.D. candidate, 2011; Hofstra University School of Law. Dedicated to my Note Adviser,
Professor J. Scott Colesanti, without whom I would not know the first thing about securities, and to
my father, Dr. Scott C. Truver, without whom I would not know the first thing about writing. Thank
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